

- *175 tance. The grazing grounds of the western slopes of the Altai were used not by Khalkha tribesmen of the main group of tribes in Outer Mongolia, but by Torguts and Ölöts of the Western Mongol groups of tribes, whose pastures were partly in north-western Outer Mongolia and partly in Sinkiang.
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578 In the same region there were Kazakhs, whom the Imperial authorities had considered as "tenants" of the Mongols, paying the Mongols for the pastures that they used and having no claim to territory of their own. Some of these Kazakhs made use of summer pasture in the Baitik Bogda. The Baitik Bogda were also partly occupied by Mongols, who practiced a certain amount of agriculture in addition to owning livestock. In the winter it was the custom of the Kazakhs to leave most of their horses in the Baitik Bogda, horses being able to paw down through the snow to get winter feed, but to bring their sheep, cattle, and camels down into the Jungarian Desert, where they were clearly within the jurisdiction of Sinkiang. There was a tendency on the part of the Kazakhs to move clear across the desert and up to the lower slopes of the Bogda Ula near Kuchengtze; but the policy of the Sinkiang authorities was to drive them back toward the Baitik Bogda and to keep them out of the jurisdiction of Sinkiang, because they were regarded as cattle thieves and troublemakers. In practice, therefore, the attitude of the Sinkiang authorities was that the Baitik Bogda lay outside of Sinkiang.
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648 By 1948, however, the attitude of the Sinkiang provincial authorities and of the Chinese military command had changed. The Kazakh leader Osman Bator, who has already been mentioned, had at first joined the Kulja coalition, had later broken with it, and had withdrawn to the foothills of the Bogda Ula. The policy of the Chinese authorities was to encourage him to move northward from this region and to occupy the Baitik Bogda, which were accordingly claimed as Chinese territory.
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648 These attempts on the part of the Chinese-supported Kazakhs were resisted by Outer Mongolian frontier patrols, and the frontier incidents which resulted were sensationally reported. No

The Peoples of Sinkiang

131

acquire the determining political power within clans and tribes and secure the best allocations of pasture. Disputes over winter quarters are the most common cause of quarrels between clans and tribes, and similarly the fact that good winter quarters are often on land suitable for cultivation is the commonest cause of friction between Kazakh or Mongol nomads and colonizing Uighur or Chinese farmers.

The economic development of the Sinkiang and Russian Kazakhs has not been uniform since the Soviet Revolution. The pastoral economy of the Sinkiang Kazakhs has not improved, but conditions have become worse where the Chinese authorities have permitted colonization of some of their territory by Uighurs or Chinese. On the Soviet side of the frontier, the traditional nomadic economy has been strongly modified. "Clan collectivism" has given way to socialist collectivism. Winter quarters and summer pastures are owned by collectives which are not necessarily formed out of kinship clans; the breeds of livestock have been improved; and agriculture has been developed in combination with the pastoral economy. In addition industrialization has been introduced on a very large scale, including coal and copper mining. In coal mining, particularly, a fairly large Kazakh labor force is engaged; and out of industry and the improvements in farming and herding have developed opportunities for higher education and technical training.

The Kazakh language belongs to the Turkic group of the Altaic family, and is closely related to other Turkic languages in Inner Asia, and to Osman Turkish. The language of Sinkiang and Soviet Kazakhs is identical. There was almost complete illiteracy among both groups until the Soviet Revolution. The small number of literates, mainly within the upper classes and the clergy, used the Arabic alphabet, which is unsuited to the phonology of the Turkic languages. After the Bolshevik Revolution a Latin alphabet was introduced, with the addition of a few special letters; this script was replaced in 1940 by the Cyrillic alphabet, again with the addition of a few special letters. The attack on illiteracy went slowly in the first years under the Soviet system. In 1931, 77 per

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Pivot of Asia

631 Moslems because such scholarly incentives as exist among them
212 consist mainly of acquiring a modicum of ability to read the
Koran in Arabic.

* 563 The influence of Islam on the status of women appears to be
562 somewhat less baleful. Sinkiang Moslem women generally enjoy
779 more freedom than their sisters in Islamic countries of the Near
East, and those who belong to the Chinese Moslem community
rank high in this respect. The institution of purdah, for example,
does not exist among them.

* 563 The most marked influence of Islam among the Chinese has
779 been as a political force, to unite those of Moslem faith against
186 Chinese not of the faith. Chinese Moslem society is even stronger
668 in patriarchal authority and clan loyalty than "heathen" Chinese
[602] society. The principle that well-to-do members of a clan have a
responsibility for the welfare of their poorer distant relatives, as
well as advantages over them, is given a heightened authority
among Moslem Chinese by the feeling that they form a minority
which must keep its ranks closed; whereas among non-Moslem
Chinese, the precept is often honored but not conscientiously
observed. In times of civil war and peasant rebellion, especially,
Moslem war lord armies normally combine military discipline and
community loyalty: they are not merely troops and officers, but
clansmen and chieftains. Even in periods of widespread peasant
unrest, therefore, the leaders of the Chinese Moslem communities
are usually able to lead Moslem peasants against both non-Mos-
lem peasants and non-Moslem landlords. Often what starts as a
Moslem peasant revolt is taken over by Moslem landlords and
converted into a movement to expand the whole Moslem com-
munity against the non-Moslem community, and to prevent the
Moslem community from being infiltrated either by Chinese na-
tionalism or by ideas of social revolution.

* 563 The essentially nonreligious character of the internecine wars
● 578 among the two main groups of Chinese in Sinkiang, however, in
186 spite of the appeal to Islam in closing the ranks of the Chinese
Moslems, is indicated by the failure of the Moslem Chinese to
establish anything more than temporary alliances with their co-

The Peoples of Sinkiang

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religionists of other nationalities. During the great uprising of the third quarter of the last century the Moslem Chinese sided for a time with their Uighur and Kirghiz coreligionists against the Chinese-Manchu regime, subsequently came to blows with their Uighur comrades in arms, and with the collapse of the revolt were virtually exterminated by the Imperial forces. The revolts of the early 1930's displayed the same feature of initial alliance, followed by final break, between Moslems of Uighur and Chinese origin.

If these examples indicate the instability of the religious tie between the Chinese Moslems and others of the same religion in Sinkiang, the harmonious relations which developed later in the 1930's between the Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese demonstrates that under certain conditions the two groups are able to relegate the differences between them to a subordinate importance. It appears then that the Chinese population in Sinkiang is confronted by two possible lines of development. One is to focus around the religious issue all other differences of interest until the process of cleavage results in the formation of two definitely separate nationalities. The other is to subordinate their differences, to the point where religion is no more a barrier to common nationality than it is among Americans, English, and other peoples.

In the past, the precipitant of hostility between Chinese Moslems and non-Moslems within Sinkiang has often been the arrival of reinforcements from outside the province. In every period of insurrection, when war bands of Chinese Moslems from Kansu, Ninghsia, or Ch'inghai (Kokonor) have invaded Sinkiang, the Chinese Moslems of Sinkiang have risen to join them. They considered each other not only coreligionists but kinsmen. Together they not only fought non-Moslem Chinese, but massacred whole communities. When, on the other hand, the non-Moslem Chinese received reinforcements, they were equally savage in their repression of the Dungans. The record in bloodiness was set by the armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang. When they took Uighur towns, surrender was usually accepted without massacre because the

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*563 Uighurs were regarded as only political rebels. When they defeated Chinese Moslems, however, they massacred women and children as well as men, because these communities were regarded as not only political rebels but traitors to the Chinese blood.

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668 Since the end of the war against Japan the Chinese reinforcements sent to Sinkiang have been principally non-Moslem troops of the National Government, though crack Moslem cavalry have been stationed on the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic in the disputed Baitik Bogda area. The great Moslem war lords of Northwest China have been fully engaged in the militarily difficult and politically delicate dual operation of preventing the Chinese Communists from expanding into their satrapies, while at the same time consolidating in those satrapies an autonomous power sufficiently strong to refuse to allow the National Government either to send in garrisons or to collect taxes. They have had no forces to spare for independent adventures in Sinkiang. In compensation the National Government, while losing authority over the Moslems of Northwest China, gained the upper hand over them in Sinkiang. Playing on the social conservatism of the Chinese Moslems, they were for a time at least able to align them against Turkic nationalism and still more against the more revolutionary "coalition nationalism" of the Kulja movement.

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648 Backed by over 100,000 National Government troops with relatively good training and American equipment, and with the Moslem Chinese unable to dispute the ascendancy of the non-Moslems, the position of the Chinese as a whole in Sinkiang, in the last years of Kuomintang rule, was curious. Their troops gave them formidable striking power against an insurrection at almost any one point, but not the decisive power to crush, as a whole, the nationalism which increasingly pervaded the entire province. Political and military decisions lay in the hands of high Chinese officials almost none of whom were natives of the province. As individuals, they were not engaged in the defense of old vested interests but, all too often, in the acquisition of new personal interests.

423 applies water to land has the right to both water and land; but
241 by a legal reasoning which is not difficult to follow, the ancient prescriptive communal right of the man whose labor helps to bring the water to the field can be superseded by the claim of the man who organized the labor and directed the enterprise.

578 Thus in 1940, in the large oasis of Aksu, the Chinese district
423 magistrate ordered the digging of a canal to open a new settle-
241 ment at Sachintze, about forty miles south of the district city. Each head of a household applying for land in the new settlement was allotted a section of about one hundred feet on the bank of the main canal. He was then entitled to as much land reaching back from this canal frontage as he could clear and as much water as he needed to irrigate it. Land and water rights were thus combined, and were in proportion to the amount of labor at the disposal of the settler. It is not surprising to find both that quarrels over water rights are chronic, and that those who are powerful and successful within the community in other ways are usually successful also in maintaining and increasing their water rights.

566 More than a hundred years ago, at a time when the Chinese
312 or Manchu imperial authority in Sinkiang was exercised only in
423 questions of high policy and rarely interfered with questions of local custom, a Chinese writer recorded the abuses of the Beggars or local notables, and the efforts made by the Chinese administration to "persuade" them to concede some of their water rights to poor peasants. In the eighteenth century, a Manchu writer noted that Beggars or landed gentry had rights over households of *chakar* or serfs who were obliged to till their land for them.¹³ By their claim on the labor of these serfs, the Beggars under the doctrine of *mawat* also claimed the right to water from canals dug by the serfs.¹⁴ *Chakar* serfdom still survives here and there. Field investigation revealed a landlord in Kucha with over two hundred

¹³ Sung Yin, *A Sketch of Sinkiang*, written in the eighteenth century, published in 1821; Ch. 3, p. 28 (in Chinese).

¹⁴ E. Zalkhina, *Outlines of the Agrarian Problem in Central Asia*, p. 9 (in Russian).

Geography and Economic Development 165

households of *chakars*, from whom he claimed both labor services and rent in kind. 566
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When the water finally gets to the field, its allocation to the cultivator is calculated in terms of the flow for a certain number of hours, according to the width and depth of the canal. Millers have the right only to run water over the wheel, and must then return it to the canal. Such matters, together with the maintenance of registers and the supervision of upkeep, are under the authority of an official called the *mirab*, who is locally elected, which means that in his election the locally influential families usually determine the choice. In addition, Moslem religious officials have certain traditional rights, especially of adjudication. Within localities, disputes are most frequent in the spring, when each cultivator is eager to be the first to get water on his land. Between localities, the most important disputes are between upstream and downstream communities. Disputes have been going on for twenty-five years between Yarkand, which is big and powerful, and Merket, which is smaller but rich in the cultivation of cotton. Quarrels can be carried from lower to higher authority. A dispute between the villages of Punak and Malihalihan, in the subdistrict of Chira, was carried up to the district administrator of Khotan, who decreed that for two days each month in February, April, and June Punak should turn over its flow of water to Malihalihan. The intervention of higher authority is a traditional opportunity for the collection of bribes by Chinese officials. 312
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Oases vary greatly in size but closely resemble each other in structure. Every oasis has a village or town, sometimes a walled city at its center. Larger oases may have several such towns. These centers are called "bazaars" and serve as market places for farm produce. In the larger bazaars there are also artisans such as blacksmiths, carpenters, coppersmiths, cobblers, and wheelwrights. Smaller bazaars, which cannot support many permanent shops, have their market day on different days of the week and the merchants and artisans visit them in rotation. 361
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Around the bazaars are the farms, each with its own homestead. An important function of an oasis bazaar is the distribution 361
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175 whilst all were irresistibly attracted to him by an ecstatic devotion
 779 of spiritual love."¹⁶

We have some notes on the theocratic feudalism of the Khojas made by the Portuguese Jesuit Father Bento de Goes, who reached Yarkand, then the capital of the Kashgar kingdom, toward the end of 1603. In February, 1604, he described Yarkand as an emporium on the long overland route between China and Europe. The severity of Moslem rule was such that as soon as the Friday service was over, twelve men left the mosque with scourges to punish those who had not attended the service.

175 Both trade and mining were administered under the feudal
 779 practice of granting privilege and monopoly. The right of or-
 661 ganizing and leading a caravan was sold by the "king" to the
 highest bidder, who then became an "ambassador," with absolute authority over those traveling with the caravan. He recovered a part of his investment by selling positions under his authority to four associates, who also received the title of ambassador; another seventy-two privileged travelers also paid for their places in the caravan.

Similarly, the monopoly for exploiting the famous jade of Khotan was also for sale. "For a high price the king sells the quarrying rights to some merchants, without whose consent no one is allowed to take away any stone as long as the contract lasts."¹⁷

175 It was a little more than a century after their conquest of China
 578 that the Manchus invaded Sinkiang in 1755. Their campaign was aimed at the Jungars or "East Wing" of the Western Mongols, called Kalmuks by the Turkish-speaking peoples of Inner Asia and by the Russians. The Jungars at this time had for decades, under a succession of military leaders, been fighting savagely among themselves, had been intermittently exercising overlordship in Tibet and over the oases of the Tarim Basin, and more recently had several times defeated the Northern Mongols or

¹⁶ Ney Elias, in *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1897, pp. 6-7.

¹⁷ C. Wessels, *Early Jesuit Travellers in Central Asia, 1603-1721*, The Hague, 1924, pp. 24-25 and 28.

Social Structures: The Living Past

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Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia. It was the breaking of the Jungar power that rounded out the Manchu Empire by giving the Manchus control over Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet.

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There were two distinct phases of this conquest. In the north, the power of the Jungars was broken by terrible massacres. It is said that half of the population was killed, 20 per cent died of disease, another 20 per cent fled into the steppes of Southern Siberia, and only 10 per cent survived, scattered through the land. Such figures, deriving from the eighteenth century, do not represent statistical accuracy, but they do indicate with rough accuracy the scale of devastation.¹⁸

In the south, there were massacres in some of the smaller oases and deportations from some of the larger oases in order to deplete their military man power. From the Kashgar region some 12,000 people were deported to the Ili Valley and settled on state lands. It is from these deportees that the Taranchis (literally "cultivators") of the Ili region are descended.¹⁹ Militarily and administratively, however, the problem of the Tarim Basin was easier to handle than that of Jungaria; the Manchus established garrisons, and then imposed an imperial superstructure on top of the existing social order.

In Jungaria, the terrible massacres made it necessary to bring in a new population, under state supervision. The population became highly diversified, and ever since that time the administration of Jungaria has involved problems of the conflicting interests of different peoples. In order to replace some of the Mongol population, some of the tribes akin to the Jungars who had been at war with the Jungar federation and had fled to Russia were invited back; those who did not return but remained in the region

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¹⁸ Fan Wen-lan and others, *A Short General History of China*, Shanghai, 1947, pp. 663-664. See also Wei Yuan, *The Sacred Military Records* (an account of the Manchu imperial campaigns), first published in 1842; also Chun Yuan, *General Records of the Western Regions*, a work written in 1776 but first published in Tientsin in 1818, Ch. 3, p. 26; another edition of this work is *Informal Records of the Barbarian Regions* (all in Chinese).

¹⁹ See Ch. IV.

175 of the lower Volga are the Mongols whom the Russians call Kal-
 •578 muks. The princes of the returning Mongol tribes were treated
 168 as favored vassals of the Manchu Emperor.

In addition, settlements were established wherever cultivation was profitable. The settlers included the Taranchis, deported from the Tarim Basin; Manchu troops settled as military colonists; and a certain number of Chinese and Chinese Moslems. Under this colonization policy the land under cultivation in Ili and Jungaria increased from an estimated 240,000 *mu* (approximately 40,000 acres) at the end of the eighteenth century²⁰ to an estimated 700,000 *mu* (approximately 116,666 acres) at the end of the nineteenth century.²¹

175 In Sinkiang, as in China itself a century earlier, where the Manchus had come to power at the end of a period of terrible devastation, early Manchu policy endeavored to bring land back under cultivation by a policy of lenient taxation. Thus in Turfan and Komul Uighurs bringing land back under cultivation were allowed about five acres to a household, with seeds, implements, and working animals furnished by the state. For the first four years, after deducting seed grain from the harvest, 60 per cent of the remaining grain was to be kept by the cultivator and 40 per cent paid to the state. From the fifth year, a somewhat higher land revenue was to be assessed.²²

In Ili and Jungaria the Manchu settlers, being regarded as unquestionably loyal to the Manchu dynasty, were granted land at the rate of roughly three acres for each man (presumably each man of military age), with seeds, implements, and work animals. Some especially favored Manchus received six acres. Chinese criminal exiles, in contrast, received only two acres. The Manchu land could be considered as held on feudal tenure, inasmuch as all Manchus, Solons, and Sibos were subject to call for military

²⁰ *Sacred Military Records*, as cited, Ch. 4, figure for 1795.

²¹ Wang Shu-nan and others, *Hsinchiang T'u Chih*, or *Sinkiang Gazetteer*, compiled in 1911, published at Tientsin in 1923, Ch. 30, pp. 2-3 (figure for the period 1900).

²² *Hsinchiang T'u Chih* as cited, Ch. 28, p. 11.

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N The Chinese, fully aware of their old culture and history, continued up to our times to consider Mongols, Turks and Tibetans if not as barbarians, at least as inferior peoples. This attitude of the Chinese caused, perhaps as an understandably psychological reaction, the superiority-complex behaviour of some minorities. In addition, the higher efficiency and diligence of the average Chinese peasant in comparison with the average non-Chinese did not help mutual understanding and esteem.

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[17] Constitutionally, for the first time in centuries, the minorities are not only considered by the present Communistic regime as absolutely equal to any other racial or ethnic group but they are also treated with consideration. The Communists do everything in order to avoid hurting the nationalistic feeling of the minorities. The price the minorities have to pay for a certain degree of local self-determination, independence and self-government is the thorough acceptance of the party line with all its consequences, above all, collectivization, which certainly means an incredible change of the traditional economic pattern, because eight ninths of the total population are peasants and only the remaining one ninth are pastoral nomads, whose livestock - collectivization is yet to come.

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N Since the overwhelming majority of the population of the Northwest consists of Chinese, the attitude toward the state in general is positive. Natural recognition of the government lies in the traditional line of Chinese behavior. The deep-rooted respect for "magistracy" and officialdom implies this basic recognition.

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N The relationship between Chinese Communist rulers and ruled Chinese (whether Communist or not) might be described as less frictional than that between the non-Chinese minorities and the Chinese Communist rulers, that is, a certain tension and uneasiness between the Uighur Autonomous Region and the government has occurred several times during the last five years, and also between the Tibetans of Chinghai and the Communist authorities, and the recent uprisings of Tibetans (July 1956) seem to be of major significance.

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N Generally speaking, the average Chinese in the Northwest has neither a sense of common destiny or any sense of mission. The average Chinese peasant's life is concerned with one main and urgent problem: livelihood. Quite different is the situation among the intelligentsia, who are culture conscious to such a degree that it often results in a feeling of superiority over other peoples. Among those intellectuals there is a strong feeling and conviction that China has a grand mission in Asia - cultural and political leadership.

175 widely distributed and separated from each other by non-Mongol peoples. These Torguts were located in the Tienshan Range above the oasis of Karashahr, on the northern slopes of the Tienshan, and on the southern slopes of the Altai.

The Bato Setkhiltu League was composed of three banners of Khoshuts who lived on the Yulduz plateau in the heart of the central Tien Shan.

The Ching Setkhiltu League, which included three banners of Khoshuts and seven of Urianghai, was located in the Chuguchak-Altai area in northern Sinkiang.

The Chahars in the Borotala Valley, and the Oirat in the valleys of the Tekes and Kash rivers in the Ili region were not included in the leagues.

However, the Chahars and Urianghai are not true Western Mongols. The former were transplanted from Chahar by the Manchus after the conquest of Dzungaria in the eighteenth century; the latter are descendants of tribes who originally lived in what is now Tannu Tuva.

175 Through Yang Tseng-hsin's efforts, Sinkiang remained neutral
159 in the civil war that raged in China in 1926-27. His troops kept out
635 the forces of the "Christian General" Feng Yu-hsiang. On his own
648 initiative, he negotiated a new treaty with the Soviet government permitting Soviet consulates to operate in Sinkiang even after the National Government broke off relations with Soviet Russia in 1927. With the establishment of the National Government at Nanking, Yang wired his acknowledgement of, and allegiance to, the new government, which confirmed his position as governor.

2. Governor Chin Shu-jen

175 Yang Tseng-hsin came from the southwestern province of Yunnan
159 and during his rule many men from Yunnan had followed him to Sinkiang. In 1928, a fellow Yunnan official, allegedly with the connivance of the Chinese Communists and the Russians, murdered Yang at a banquet in his honor. The military commander Chin Shu-jen, who was believed to be implicated in the assassination plot, immediately suppressed the revolt and put the ringleaders to death. He then maneuvered himself into the position of governor.

[648] Under Chin, the government of Sinkiang virtually disintegrated. Corruption was rife. Chin himself set the example for rapacity. He ruled in open defiance of the National Government at Nanking to the extent of concluding, on his own initiative and without the cognizance of Nanking, a new agreement with Soviet Russia in 1931. The agreement permitted Soviet authorities to establish eight commercial agencies in Sinkiang and to have complete control over telegraph and radio communications, thus increasing Soviet influence in the province. The deterioration of economic conditions, heightened by spiralling inflation and the exploitation by Chin's minions, oppression, and inequities, led to widespread discontent. The situation was ripe for

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rebellion.

The rebellion began at Qomul (Hami), where at the death of the old prince, the Chinese had taken over the region and divided it into three administrative districts under the rule of Chinese magistrates. Then, with the influx of refugees from Kansu, Chin ousted the Uighurs from one of the three districts to provide land for the refugees. To make things worse, the Uighurs had to pay taxes while the Chinese refugees were exempted for three years. Finally, when a tax-collector forced a pretty Uighur girl to marry him against her will, the Uighurs rose in anger and killed the tax collectors and the refugees.

When Chin sent troops to put down the rebellion, the Uighur rebels sought the aid of Ma Chung-ying, a young Chinese Moslem (Dungan) officer from Kansu. Entering Sinkiang in 1932 with 400 men, his [648] force was soon swelled by local recruits. The Japanese, seeking an opportunity to intervene in Sinkiang, were believed to have given him guidance and moral support, if not actually funds and military equipment. Barkol (Chen-hsi) and Qomul (Hami), as well as large areas of eastern Sinkiang, fell to the arms of the young conqueror. However, his attack on Urumchi was beaten back by a young Manchurian officer, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whom Chin Shu-jen had brought to Sinkiang to take command of the army.

[648] Sheng's defenders were later reinforced by Manchurian troops, who had been interned in Soviet Siberia and who were repatriated and sent to Sinkiang. They were called the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army.

With the arming and augmenting of both the provincial government army and the rebel forces, the civil war increased in ferocity and intensity. There was a heavy slaughter of the Han Chinese, the Chinese Moslems, and the Uighurs. Meanwhile, the Russian mercenaries stationed at Urumchi, whose pay had been in arrears, also revolted. In the pandemonium, Chin fled the city and found refuge in Russia. Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to the fore to take control over the army and the civil government.

3. Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai

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669 Although frustrated in his assaults on Urumchi in 1932 and again in 1934, Ma Chung-ying was able to expand his power from Qomul (Hami) westward to Kashgar, hemming in Urumchi from all sides. In his marches back and forth across Sinkiang he left wide swaths of pillage and rapine, death and desolation in his wake. His far-ranging depredations were the signal for other bands of insurgents to rise. The Chinese military commander of Ili raised the banner of independence. In the Tarim Basin, the local Han Chinese and Chinese Moslem residents had banded together into an Eastern Turkestan Army to defend themselves against the ravages of Ma Chung-ying. In November, 1933, a group of Burut chiefs, assisted by returned-students from Turkey, seized control of the Eastern Turkestan Army and established an Eastern Turkestan Republic at Kashgar. In their newly-drafted constitution, they stated that the structure of their government would be based on the Koran, and all decrees and laws

175 assistance to the Ili rebels. Later, however, when the Chinese
669 Communists came to power, there were profuse statements thank-
648 ing the Soviet Government for its unstinted aid and support. Soviet
support to the Ili rebels was more apparent on the diplomatic plane.
The Soviet consul-general at Urumchi was openly friendly to the
rebels. He gave them every encouragement, while he played his
game as intermediary between Kazakh insurgents and the Chinese
authorities.

175 The negotiations between the Ili regime and the Chinese govern-
669 ment delegates headed by Chang Chih-chung lasted from October,
1945, to June, 1946. The insurgents were willing to abandon their
independence if the Chinese government would grant them autonomy.
The Chinese negotiators were willing to permit the Ili regime to
retain its armed forces as a peace preservation corps if the Chinese
could have top military command and full authority in Sinkiang's
diplomatic affairs.

Finally a settlement was reached in the summer of 1946. An
agreement was signed providing for a reconciliation between the
Chinese authorities and the rebel leaders. Attached to the agree-
ment were two codicils concerning the reform of the provincial
government and reorganization of the armed forces. The terms of
the settlement also contained provisions for the election of district
officials by adult suffrage and for the formation of a provincial gov-
ernment composed of men, some of whom were appointed by the
Chinese government and some nominated by the provincial delegates.
The use of the Uighur and Kazakh languages was permitted in schools
and in the army. To implement the agreement, Chang Chih-chung
succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as governor. Burkhan Shahidi, a Uighur,
and Akhmejan Kasimi, a Kazakh, were appointed vice-chairmen of
the provincial administration. A determined effort was made to
improve the government and to give the local people a greater voice
in political affairs.

175 However, realization of these agreements, which would have
668 given the non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang a large measure of self-
669 government, was delayed and hamstrung by distrust and hostility on
669 both sides. The military commanders and the diehard Kuomintang
• 578 party members were unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives to
563 the native leaders; the extremist native leaders were impatient and
uncompromising. In February, 1947, the more contentious elements,
led by Akhmejan Kasimi, issued a statement, known as the Kulja
Declaration. It denounced the supremacy of one nationality (the
Chinese) over the other nationalities of Sinkiang, and called for the
unification of all the races of Sinkiang under a native government.
Adopting a moderate attitude, Chang Chih-chung issued a statement
declaring that, while Sinkiang should have an autonomous and demo-
cratic government, the pattern of the government should be based on
the ideas of Sun Yat-sen rather than on Soviet ideas.

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[635] The pressure on Chang Chih-chung from both sides became so intense that in May, 1947, he resigned and was succeeded by a Uighur, Maksud(Masud) Sabri. Maksud's appointment accentuated the clash of interest between rival factions in Sinkiang. The Uighur people generally supported him since he was one of them although he had spent many years of his life abroad. However, some of the more articulate popular groups denounced him vociferously and a majority of the members in the provincial assembly adopted a resolution opposing his nomination. In July, shortly after confirmation of his appointment, the Kulja delegation, headed by vice-chairman Akmejan Kasimi, withdrew. However, in a statement from Kulja (released in November) they denied that they had any intention of seceding from China and declared that they would return if their demands, including the removal of Maksud, were met. Since to dismiss Maksud so soon after his appointment in order to please the Kazakhs, would alienate the Uighurs, the National Government procrastinated and a deadlock resulted.

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648 Meanwhile the Kulja faction itself was split by dissensions. Osman Batur defected. He and his men were incorporated into the Nationalist Army and stationed at Pei-ta-shan (Baitik Bogdo) close to the border of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, claiming this region as its own, invaded in 1948 and penetrated a hundred miles into Chinese territory until they were checked by Osman Batur who was acclaimed as a hero throughout China. The dispute finally reached the United Nations without a satisfactory settlement.

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[635] By December, 1948, matters in Sinkiang had reached such an impasse that Maksud Sabri was removed and the governorship of Sinkiang was given to Burkhan Shahidi, another Uighur, who was vice-chairman of the provincial government and a middle-of-the-roader. During the first part of 1949 the Communist advance in China itself turned the attention of the National Government away from Sinkiang. In September, Saifuddin Azizi, a leader of the Kulja coalition, went to the Communist capital as a delegate to the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and he brought word of the submission of the Ili faction to the Chinese Communists. Chang Chih-chung, whom the National Government sent to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists, also surrendered and exerted his influence to persuade the officials in Sinkiang to join the Communist bandwagon. By the end of September, when Communist troops under Wang Chen pushed through the Kansu Corridor, the governor of Sinkiang, Burkhan, and the military commander, T'ao Chih-yueh, in separate telegrams, offered their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Government. A few days later, Communist troops reached and occupied Urumchi.

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E. Population Problems

563 1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and the Chinese

578 Of the many problems in regard to the population of North-
669 west China, the traditional antagonism between the Moslems
648 and the Chinese, together with its international complications,
175 is by far the most serious. Moslem uprisings have been
frequent and often caused great massacres on both sides. In
most cases the Moslem disturbances are supported and made
use of by ambitious neighboring powers, particularly Russia
- both Tsarist and Soviet. In 1871 Tsarist Russia used the
1861-1874 Moslem disturbance as a pretext to occupy the Ili
Valley and then force China to cede the lower part of the Valley,
west of Khargos to Russia. Time and again Russia took advantage
of Moslem troubles in Sinkiang to make some special territorial,
political and economic demands in the provinces, i. e., free
trade in Sinkiang by the Ili Commercial Treaty of 1851 and the
cession of the territory west of Tarbagatai by the treaty of
Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) in 1864.

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648 Sinkiang had always been a center of international intrigue
between Russia and Britain for the spoils of Central Asia, as
well as the barometer of power relations between Russia and
China. (See Foreign Relations).

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2. The Uighur Autonomy

642 Under the Chinese Communist Regime, Sinkiang became
177 the Uighur Autonomous Area in September, 1955. A National
[668] Autonomy for Sinkiang was first recommended by General
Chang Chih-chung, a liberal Nationalist Government high
official in 1946-49. He was "influenced by views of American
politicians who insisted that the principle of self-government
should be applied to Sinkiang also - an illusory wish for a
people which stood between Russia and China, like a mouse
between two cats." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

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167 A continuous great influx of Chinese to Sinkiang has
708 occurred, which is particularly marked by the present-day
466 Army Construction Corps and the presence of the Corrective
Labor Force. The soldiers are sent to meet the urgent
demand of labor to undertake the gigantic construction pro-
gram and the latter, estimated at several hundred thousands,
are condemned to forced labor in the thinly populated border
areas. (See: Labor).

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642 "Since the Chinese Communist troops entered Sinkiang,
668 the rulers have always been Chinese, and at present, with
177 the introduction of autonomy, this Chinese domination is the
more emphasized." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

Furthermore, Government officials are transferred from
Peking to Sinkiang in large numbers. On August 21, 1955,
seventy-nine officials from the "First Grade Offices" of the
Central Government left Peking for Sinkiang; at the same time

/Chinese Moslems/

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equal to or even higher than Muhammad himself. Most of his followers were uneducated. They believed that he had divine revelations since, without instruction, he had answers to all questions and appeared to know many things. As the founder of a new sect, he had to prescribe certain external forms by which his adherents might be distinguished from others. The differences he ordered are best described by W. T. Chan in the following passage:

"The New Sect insists that a certain chapter of the Koran should be recited once only instead of three times as held by the Old Sect, that at prayer clasped hands should be raised once instead of twice, that after a meal there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting, and that in singing the praise of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. With reference to religious service, the New Sect does not allow any substituting for an ahung in preaching, whereas the Old Sect permits such an arrangement. The two sects also disagree on the basis for calculating the period of fasting, with the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arabic method and the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar Calendar. The New Sect believes that at funerals the mourners should take off their shoes, and stand on a mat while praying for the dead, whereas the Old Sect holds fast to the tradition of standing on the ground with the shoes on. The New Sect also directs that the corpse be laid on the ground, whereas the Old Sect insists on its being on a platform. There is also a disagreement as to whether there should be an honoraria for preachers. In short, the New Sect insists on returning to Islamic traditions, but the Old Sect prefers to keep the customs that have developed in China through the centuries." (Religious Trends in Moslem China, p. 193.)

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Being partly dedicated to ideas of forming a Moslem state in the Northwest, independent of China proper, Ma Hua-lung played a very important role in the Moslem rebellion during the nineteenth century.

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After the death of Ma Hua-lung, friction developed in his sect. His son-in-law, Ma Ta-hsi, and his grandson, Ma Hi-hsi, fought each other for the sacred inheritance. Ma Ta-hsi had the advantage of numbers and his place of residence, Cha-ku, became an important religious center.

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Chang distinguished another sect existing in the Northwest, which he identifies as the New New Sect. Unfortunately there is not much evidence as to its nature. He also mentions a Sufi order in the Northwest called Che-ho-yeh (corruption of Jah-rivah). The latter is described as "having an abbot, like the Buddhist lama. It is heavily superstitious and is generally despised by other schools." D'Ollone and Hartmann, however, identify this sect as that of Ma Hua-lung, the name Jahriya

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 Suppression of external expression of nationalism appears to be an acceptance of the present regime, but it certainly is not to be regarded as constituting the fulfillment of the national dreams of the Turkic people in Sinkiang. The great number of Eastern
[167] Turki refugees from Sinkiang testify to the fact that they consider the new regime as much more oppressive than the former Nationalist administration. During the former Chinese Imperial and Republican rule of Sinkiang, no similar mass flight of Turks occurred. The number of refugees alone indicates deep discontent.

563 C. The Traditional Animosity between the Turks and Chinese
578 The animosity of the Turks to the Chinese is one of the tradi-
669 tional attitudes which became evident in the many Moslem rebel-
186 lions against the Chinese administration in Sinkiang. The Turks regard the Chinese not only as their oppressors (Turk: gaddar) but also as infidels (Turk: kafir), who have not received the true knowledge about God. While being politically and militarily stronger and superior to the Turks, the Chinese are regarded as inferior by the Turks in culture and faith. Loyalty to the Chinese regime is not strong and is maintained by force and political pressure. We have seen the Moslem reaction to Chinese rule in the past - during the 1860's and the 1930's when large-scale rebellions took place against the existing regime. One may even take into consideration
[648] the events that took place in Western Turkestan during World War II. Many of the Western Turkestanian battalions which constituted a part of the Red Army defected to the German Army. They later were organized into special units and joined the fighting against Soviet Russia. At the present, the occurrence of such an event seems unlikely in Sinkiang, and there has been no indication of an organized large-scale rebellion, or any spirited attempts to oppose the existing regime. It is likely, however, that it would be extremely difficult to trust the Turks fully as Chinese patriots. They could not be used effectively as soldiers, since their true loyalty lies with Turkic nationalism in an Islamic framework.

121 D. The Conflict of Islamic and Communist Ideologies
979 Before considering Islam in relation to other ideologies it is necessary to remember that Islam is not to be regarded as a religion only, but also as a social and political philosophy, forming a set pattern for the religious, social and political living of all Moslems. Any political ideology which attempts to enter the domain of Islam has not only to cope with a religious doctrine, but to compete with the ideas of Islam in the realm of politics.

Another important basic conception to keep in mind is the division of the world in Islam into two domains, the first of which is constituted of the believers, who have submitted to Islam - Dar

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668 other living materials is limited to those which are "legitimate."
642 Thus landlords cannot legitimately collect rent on land and
421 interest on loans. The legal status of house rent and banks'
[651] payment of interest on deposit are not yet clarified. The duty of
[461] paying taxes (article 102), the privilege of working hard (article
91), and the responsibility of offering contributions in labor,
money and kind, furnish more means for the Communist government
to ensure "the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the
building of a socialist society." (article 4)

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668 Late in 1950, the agrarian reform movement began to spread.
423 The movement did not concern itself only with the redistribution
422 of land, but also included the confiscation and redistribution of
draft animals, farm implements, grain supplies, and so forth,
which was later to be followed by a program of cooperativization.
Some excerpts from the Chinese press will illustrate how the
agrarian reform was handled in the Northwest.

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[668] The New China News Agency, November 16, 1950, reported:
[421] "The farmers in Sinkiang, including the various minorities, deeply
[651] felt the warmth of the People's Government and the People's Army
and requested to pay more taxes (in grain)... At the same time,
the peasants in various places universally started class struggle
against the... criminal landlords."

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668 The same agency, December 7, 1950, reported the start of a
423 "Rent Reduction and Down with Local Despots" campaign in the
N Northwest as a prelude to full scale land reform. From the win-
* 668 ter of 1950 through the spring of 1951, it was reported that 3017
423 hsiang (administrative villages) confiscated more than 1,000,000
mou of land (each mou is ca. 1/6 acre), 30,000 heads of draft
animals and more than 200,000 pieces of farm implements in
Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. By May, 1952,
4364 hsiang in the Northwest had completed 72.6% of the original
quota. (NCNA, May 28, 1951). In total, during the winter and
spring seasons of 1951 and 1952 more than 20,000,000 mou of land
were confiscated in the Northwest. The population who received
land and other productive material was from 10,000,000 to
12,000,000 people. (Sian Ch'uh-chung Jih-pao, May 5, 1952.)

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668 Thus Burhan, the Governor of Sinkiang, could report to the
423 Sinkiang Provincial People's Congress on September 20, 1955:
"From September, 1952 to the end of 1953, in the agricultural
district of Sinkiang we completed the whole program of land reform.
We destroyed the landlord class. We abolished feudal land owner-
ship. We confiscated and condemned more than 7,300,000 mou
land and other properties to be distributed to 2,100,000 poor
farmers with little or no land."

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[578] A report by the Vice Secretary-general of the Communist
party at Aksu, Sinkiang, P'eng I-min, in Sinkiang jih-pao, April
3, 1953, reveals, however, some of the difficulties which the land
reform movement encountered in Sinkiang.

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668 reform movement encountered in Sinkiang. The attempts at forced
423 cooperation resulted in many hard feelings and in violations of the
578 principles set forth by the government. Examples were cited of
474 "middle farmers" supplying carts or other tools, but not participating in the actual labor. Village cadres were unwilling to work on the cooperative farms lest their private interests suffer. Considerable difficulties were experienced in finding people who would accept responsibility. A partial solution was sought in sending more professional party workers to aid the cadres.

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* 668 Similar reports are available from other parts of the North-
423 west. From these reports the following trends can be gathered:
474 (1) In the program of cooperativization the policy was to exclude
S not only the landlords but also the rich farmers. Since those who
668 were not in the cooperatives would suffer social and economic ostracism, the threat to all individual farmers kept out of the co-
423 operatives was great.
474 (2) The experience of those who did join the cooperative groups, however, was not happy. Their hard work often was not properly rewarded. It was difficult to keep the record of credits straight. This was the reason why many cooperatives collapsed.
(3) However, the average farmer, including the party cadre, dreamed of becoming a rich farmer and private businessman.

Against this background one can understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's drive for one million cooperatives in 1955. According to Mao's plan, by the spring of 1958 half of the agricultural population must be organized into cooperatives. In other words, by that time, half of the farmers in Northwest China would no longer be working on their own farms.

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* 668 In the field of commerce and industry, the 3-anti and 5-anti
474 movements were the prelude to the program which calls for the
S total elimination of private enterprise.

668 As described above, the political rights in the Chinese Soviet
474 days followed the conventional Communist Party line. But during
N the Second World War, the Chinese Communists had advocated
* 668 their democratic government and democratic elections in the
666 border regions. Their procedure of a secret ballot included the following practices: "Each of the candidates' names is written on a bowl. The voter drops a bean or pea in the bowl bearing the name of his choice. If his election "unit" is entitled to more than one representative, he is given the proper number of beans. If a considerable number of the voters cannot read, the candidates are lined up, each carrying a well-balanced bowl or basket on his back. The voter drops his bean or beans into the bowl or bowls of his favorite candidate or candidates. The bowl is carried on the back to insure secrecy, so that no candidate knows who elects whom." (Hsu Yung Ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 59.)

175 mass meeting of 3,500 mullahs in 46 mosques in Urumchi was
668 held on May 20, 1951, and again on May 25, 1953, to reaffirm
[793] their pledge to support Mao Tse-tung, the CCP, the Central
[346] People's Government and the Resist-America and Aid-Korea
[795] campaign. Burkhan, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Govern-
ment, was concurrently head of the China Islamic Association,
which had the responsibility of rallying the Moslems of China
under the banner of the Chinese Communists.

"Through the above-mentioned activities," declared Yü Chan-
lin, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative
Conference, "the policies of the (Communist) party and the
people's government ... have been conveyed to the masses of
various nationalities and various circles (i.e., political groups),
so that the misgivings and the hesitant attitude on the part of
certain people were corrected and the masses mobilized... thus
enlarging the anti-feudal United Front." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June
19, 1953). As for the future, Yü urged further propaganda on
"patriotism and internationalism" by means of mass movements,
intensification of the mobilization of all the nationalities and all
the political groups, and further supervision over the masses.

The Sinkiang jih-pao, in an editorial (June 30, 1953), also
expressed gratification with the progress of the mobilization of
the masses. "During the past four years, the people of all
nationalities and all circles have been educated by repeated patri-
otic campaigns and experiences in various political activities,
thereby increasing their organizational ability and their political
consciousness. The general election will further consolidate and
unite the people of all nationalities and the ties between the People's
Government and the masses, thus enabling the state system of our
people's democratic dictatorship to become more perfect."

C. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries

668 The efforts of the Communists to herd and regiment the people
669 were not accomplished without considerable resistance. Large
• 578 segments of the people refused to enter into the Communist fold
175 and their resistance, strong and stubborn, made it necessary for
the Communist authorities to launch campaigns for the suppression
of the opposition, whom the Communists designate as "counter-
revolutionaries."

The "counter-revolutionaries" or "bandits" were, according to
Wang Chen, commander of the Communist forces which entered
Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of
the Chinese Communist Party, composed of the following groups:
(1) Former Nationalist forces; (2) local forces under Osman Batur,
Mehmet Emin Bughra, Jamin Khan and Yolbars Khan; (3) White
Russians; (4) members of secret societies; (5) bandits; and, he
added, "all sorts of subversive espionage organizations (which)

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make use of reactionary elements of Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism to establish anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bases of operation." (JMJP October 1, 1950).

The extent of opposition to Communist rule may be seen in the news dispatches issued by the Communist authorities on the results of their relentless crack-down of the counter-revolutionaries:

Item: September, 1950, liquidation of 58,000 bandit troops who refused to disarm and continued to resist.

Item: November, 1950, arrest of 6,249 Kuomintang agents and seizure of 208 special service cells and 275 radio stations.

Item: February, 1951, capture of Osman Batur and Jamin Khan and escape of Yolbars Khan to Formosa. April, 1951, Execution of Osman Batur.

Item: 1951. Revolt of workers in the Yen-ch'ang Oilfield, Shensi.

Item: December, 1950, Suppression of the Taoist secret society, the I-kuan-tao, which claimed to have 100,000 members in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia. Members of the organization were charged to have infiltrated into farmers' associations and sabotaged the land reform and peasant organization work.

Despite the savagery of the suppression, the Communists were unable to snuff out the opposition. Kan Ssu-ch'i, director of the Department of Public Security of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, pointed out that in the province of Kansu alone, the counter-revolutionaries killed and wounded 2,117 native cadres resulting in a profound demoralization of the people. "The people blame us," he said, "for having only government and no law. We must...by means of accusation meetings, exhibitions, public trials and forums, mobilize the broad masses to partake in the work of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries." (NCNA, April 7, 1951).

The alibis for the failure to wipe out the opposition in the Northwest was attributed to many causes. T'ao Chih-yueh, deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military District, charged that "hidden enemies are utilizing old relations, old friendships and all opportunities for winning over and buying over a few backward elements." Ma Hung-pin, vice-chairman of the Kansu provincial people's government, warned the people to renounce their old friendships. "All counter-revolutionaries," he said, "be they your relatives, your friends and your neighbors, or even your family members, must be denounced." (NCNA, April 7, 1951). Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, charged that "the imperialists" were fanning the fires of "narrow nationalism" by spreading rumors and fostering animosity among the minority peoples and they have seized upon pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as their weapons." (JMJP, October 2, 1951).

The admonition and the threats by the officials had no effect

N in curbing the hostility of segments of the population towards the
*175 Communist regime. Sabotage as well as open rebellion continued
*668 unabated, as the following items, culled from Communist papers,
*669 show:

578 Item: November, 1951, arsonists set fire to the Urumchi Fur
Factory causing a loss of two billion yuan (US \$100,000).

175 Item: April to July, 1952. Revolt of Chinese Moslems in Kansu,
668 who killed over 3,000 Communist cadres and many government
669 officials and seized control of three districts.

• 578 Item: March to June, 1953. 1,380 "bandits" reported annihilated
in southern Kansu.

Item: December, 1953, Suppression of "bandit" forces under Ma
Liang in the Kansu-Chinghai-Szechwan border region.

Item: First half of 1954, 3,420 counter-revolutionary cases
unearthed.

IV. United Front Work, 3. The Cadres

N *175 A. Recruitment of Cadres *668

The placement of non-Communist and non-Chinese leaders in
the government and the organization of the people, while important,
were but subsidiary tasks. The principal task was the reform of
the old cadres and the recruitment of new cadres to serve as the
work forces of the party and the state. The job, which was a part
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[647] of the building of the "democratic United Front" since it concerned
the integration of Communist with non-Communist employees, was
handled by two agencies of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: the
Department of Organization, headed by Ma Wen-jui, which was
responsible for party expansion, and the Department of United
Front Work, headed by Wang Feng, which was responsible for
recruiting and integrating non-Communists and non-Chinese func-
tionaries in government and party work.

The shortage of trained cadres and the need for more were
felt by the Communist authorities from the beginning of their
rule over the Northwest. In November, 1949, barely a month
after the Communists took over the vast territories of the North-
west and two and a half months before the formation of the North-
west Military and Administrative Council, Ma Wen-jui, who had
already set up his Department of Organization, declared that the
main problem facing the Chinese Communist Party was the train-
ing and employment of new cadres (JMJP, January 4, 1950). The
need was particularly urgent in view of the depletion of trained
men due to the transfer of many of the veteran cadres of the old
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to other parts of the country
and the reluctance of the local youth to become cadres. Hsi
Chung-hsün, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese
Communist Party, pointed out that the number of men who had

175 of the Communist hierarchy and externally by popular resistance.
177 The temporary setback in the program of collectivization in
668 Shensi and Kansu in 1954 had been attributed to the hostility of
the peasants and the ineptitude of the cadres. As late as March,
1954, it was revealed that "the cultural standard of the cadres
was low; only one in every three cadres could read.... The work
of political propaganda and education of the peasants in some
areas has not been carried out well and penetratingly enough."
(Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956). One of the main reasons for
the inertia of the cadres and party members, said Chang Chung-
liang, secretary of the Kansu Chinese Communist Party commit-
tee, was their fear of the new situation created by the transition
from New Democracy to socialism, which has been added to their
rightist ideology. (NCNA November 2, 1955).

175 Besides the fear of the future, another demoralizing factor
668 was the unwillingness of the cadres and party members to leave
474 their positions in the governments and to work in the cooperatives
578 in the countryside, in defiance of the orders of their superiors.
As Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Commun-
ist Party sub-bureau, pointed out: "The largest defect during the
past year was the failure on the part of party committees of all
levels to resolutely, effectively, and properly transfer the leader-
ship center to rural work in mutual aid and cooperation. Certain
defects also exist in our work in the nationalities and religious
fields." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

175 The defects in nationality work were still charged to "the
668 vestiges of great nation chauvinism and local nationalism," caused
563 by "the practice of usurpation by Han Chinese coming from other
578 parts of China," and their disrespect to the minority cadres, and
by the minority cadres who were "conceited, unwilling to study,
refusing to observe discipline and doing things not according to
policy and principle." (NCNA September 17, 1954.)

The incompetence and demoralization of the cadres and party
members, who constitute the main working force of the Communists
in the domination of the Northwest, and the discord and friction
within their ranks went, pari passu, with the opposition of the
people, to undermine the rule of the Chinese Communists. As in
the past, popular opposition to the government was often carried
on under the trappings of religion. In the Chinese inhabited
areas of Shensi and Kansu, the Taoist secret society known as
[794] I-kuan-tao was still alive and active in the summer of 1955, and
[575] the farmers were required to sign pacts pledging to support the
government in banning this sect.

175 Out in Sinkiang, pan-Islamism still gripped the mind of the
668 people who are predominantly Moslem. "Individual counter-revo-
669 lutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam," said Burkhan last
578 year, "and, putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out
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195 counter-revolutionary activities." He said that they were carrying
668 on "rumor spreading, sabotage, and the deception of the masses in
669 an attempt to undermine our revolutionary unity." (Sinkiang jih-
578 pao, February 25, 1955). Consequently, he went on, only "legal"
795 religious activities would be permitted by the people's government.

668 By spring of 1956, as the heavy hand of Communist rule was
669 intensified, the counter-revolutionary activities of the people also
578 increased. Su Chen-yung, deputy director of the Bureau of Public
Security in the Kansu People's government, revealed the extent of
popular unrest in the Northwest when he said: "The counter-
revolutionaries have unceasingly waged their destructive activities
against the socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities
and the countryside. With the purpose of impeding the work of
peasants joining the cooperatives and sabotaging the agricultural
production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners,
wealthy peasants and Taoist leaders to cheat backward elements
into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings.
Counter-revolutionaries hidden in factories, mines, and basic
construction projects resort to such base acts as sabotaging tech-
nical reforms, stealing government secrets, and purposely com-
mitting errors of work in order to proceed with their destructive
activities. Counter-revolutionaries also hid themselves in religi-
ous circles. Under the cloak of religion, they proceeded upon
various kinds of destructive activities." (Kansu jih-pao, March
18, 1956).

This revelation of popular opposition to Communist rule almost
six years after its establishment in the Northwest shows that the
age-old conflicts of culture and ideology, which in the past have
divided the region, and the stubborn recalcitrance of the people,
which makes government difficult, still remain despite the efforts
of the Chinese Communists in centralization and domination, in
indoctrination and repression, which were unprecedented in their
severity and ruthlessness. The divisive nature of the region and
the discontent of the people are intrinsic conditions and cardinal
factors in the political life of China's Northwest. Even the Com-
munists themselves, in their public statements, have candidly
acknowledged the difficulties and foresee greater resistance from
the people as the program for socialism gets under way.

N III. Resentment of Chinese Rule

*563 These internal differences have made it impossible for the
578 people of the Northwest to cast off their Chinese rulers by united
S action and to establish a Turkic, Uighur, or federated govern-
[162] ment of their own. In Sinkiang, 90 per cent of the population is
non-Chinese, yet the forces of nationalism and of religion, which
at times made for a temporary unity, were not strong enough to
transform the sporadic revolts into a lasting revolutionary move-
ment and complete independence.

There always has been a great deal of friction between the Chi-
nese and the non-Chinese as a result of the differences in cultural
heritage. In addition, the Chinese form a ruling minority in many
parts of the Northwest and appear to the native people as a for-
eign government of occupation. In this situation, the Chinese Mos-
lems (the Dungans) have found themselves caught between two fires.
At times they sided with their Kirghiz and Uighur co-religionists,
and at other times they were compelled to support their non-Mos-
lem Chinese compatriots. As a result, they have been distrusted
by everyone and have suffered a double persecution during times
of upheaval and nationalistic or religious fanaticism.

N The Chinese method of ruling minority peoples involved the
*175 system of "divide and rule" and created friction not only with China,
659 but also among the tribes themselves. The policies of Tso Tung-
*563 t'ang in the latter part of the nineteenth century, can be taken as
578 an example. He managed to place great power in the hands of his
S own relatives and friends, and to strengthen the old social struc-
175 tures of the Mongols, Uighurs and Kazakhs through the existing
659 Begs and princes who became instruments of Chinese rule. He
563 considered the Chinese Moslems to be traitors and killed large
• 578 numbers of them while showing leniency toward the Uighurs, Mon-
gols and Kazakhs. After the Revolution of 1911, during the gov-
ernorship of Yang Tseng-hsin, the tradition of setting one people
against another was continued. Fearing that the Mongols of Sin-
kiang might unite with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia during the
revolution there, heavy restrictions were imposed upon them,
while the Kazakhs were even allowed to carry arms. Under the
previous Manchu rule, the Mongols were favored over the Kazakhs;
they were considered the rightful owners of pasture lands, while
the Kazakh tribes were treated as their "tenants."

S In the case of the Turkic Moslems, nationalism and religion
175 are almost inseparable. Their rebellions against the Chinese have
669 been the most persistent and the most violent, but only one short
648 period of freedom has broken two centuries of Chinese control.
668 Ever since 1759, when the Manchu general, Chao-hui, drove the
ruling Moslem Khojas into Khokand and extended Chinese rule into
Turkestan, the bitter resentment aroused by foreign control has
flared into periodic revolt. In the nineteenth century, while the